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BOOK REVIEWS
Joanna Wharton, Material Enlightenment: Women Writers and the
Science of Mind, 1770–1830. Suffolk: Boydell Press, 2018. xii1276 pp.
US$99.00.
JoannaWharton’sMaterial Enlightenment:WomenWriters and the Science
ofMind, 1770–1830 is a recent addition to the interdisciplinary series Studies
in the EighteenthCentury that Boydell Press (Boydell & Brewer Publishers)
is publishing in association with the British Society for Eighteenth Century
Studies. It is a welcome addition to the growing body of work that addresses
the contributions of late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century British
womenwriters to areas of scientific, philosophical, and otherwise “learned”
discourse that have historically been associated primarily—and in many
cases exclusively—with male thinkers and writers. Wharton’s study there-
fore helps to flesh out the picture of women’s intellectual, imaginative, and
cultural contributions to their times and their sociopolitical milieus that
has been traced in greater detail in the areas of literature and the arts, as
well as in political, social, and economic activism. Less widely remarked—
and even less well examined—have been the remarkable achievements of
British women like Caroline Herschel (astronomy), Etheldred Benett (of-
ten called the first female geologist), Harriet Henrietta Beaufort (botany),
Elizabeth Fulhame (chemistry), Mary Somerville (physics), Lady Hester
Stanhope (archaeology), and Maria Graham (travel writing). Women
and the science ofmind,Wharton’s particular focus, has received even less
notice, notwithstanding Alan Richardson’s work (most notably his British
Romanticism and the Science of Mind, 2001) and that of others (such as
The Wordsworth Circle (Fall 2019) © 2019 The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
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Jennie Batchelor, 2010; Sara Ahmed, 2010; and Richard Sha, 2018) who
have followed.
Central toWharton’s discussionare the vexed circumstances of uncon-
ventional thinkers (of both sexes) like Dissenters, as Anna Letitia Aikin
(Barbauld), her brother John Aikin, and her niece Lucy Aiken were, when
it came to participation in the sort of philosophical debates that are at the
center of Material Enlightenment. Locke’s challenge to the conventional
notion of innate ideas in the form of his counterparadigm of the tabula
rasa asserted that human identity was the product of individual circum-
stances, a contention that essentially signaled the transition in eighteenth-
century thinking away from character considered as a reflection of gener-
alized and primarily sharedmatter(s) and toward a view that was grounded
instead in what William Blake called “Minute Particulars.” More impor-
tantly for women, “Locke’s Essay [Concerning Human Understanding,
1689] fundamentally altered the terms of early feminist philosophy,” el-
bowing out the old Cartesian dualist model of mind in favor of an alter-
native model grounded in the bodily senses that anticipated “the feminist
potential of sense-based psychology” (9–10). Joanne Wharton proposes
that despite their exclusion from the educational opportunities afforded
theirmale contemporaries (including themedical profession), women nev-
ertheless “engaged closely and enthusiastically with the ‘science of man’”
while risking much by engaging in the “precarious” activities of “specula-
tion and disputation on the nature of mind” (7). Wharton cites Harriet
Guest’s perceptive observation that women writers’ recourse to the lan-
guage and discourse of sensibility in the context of the outbreak of war
with revolutionary France at once signaled their exclusion from partisan
political discourse and empowered them with the unbounded discourse
of human feeling (Unbounded Attachment: The Culture of Sensibility:
Sex and Society in Eighteenth-Century Britain, 1992). As Wharton sees
it, this rhetorical model enabled women to reimagine human society
and women’s place within it: not somewhere near the periphery but, in-
stead, right at the center. However, although critical attention during
the past two centuries has usually focused on the most radical feminists
(Wollstonecraft, Hays, etc.), Wharton argues that the most culturally in-
fluential discussion among early proponents of women’s potential as
“thinkers” (and therefore social theorists) came instead from more pre-
dictably conservative, conventional women writers. Moreover, the noto-
rious sexist attacks ofmale harpies such as Richard Polwhele (TheUnsex’d
Females, 1798) not only failed, ultimately, to repudiate and silence women
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philosophers, but in reality served to identify and then reinforce a farmore
diverse and pliant affiliation than what Polwhele and his male colleagues
thought they saw. This diversity of thought and community—and the ex-
tent to which the women involved recognized it, appreciated it, and cul-
tivated it—is the real sociocultural achievement that Wharton sets out to
delineate for us, demonstrating how and why we may profitably place in
revealing intellectual “conversation” writers such as Barbauld, Honora
andMaria Edgeworth, HannahMore, and Elizabeth Hamilton, in contra-
distinction to the more familiar constellation of Wollstonecraft, Hays,
Helen Maria Williams, and other early radical feminists. The more com-
plicated and highly nuanced assessment of the dynamics of Romantic-era
women’s involvement with the psychology of mind that Wharton begins
to outline here draws on the work of scholars such as the lateMitzi Myers
(on children’s literature), Kathryn Sutherland (on More), Batchelor (on
conduct literature), and Emma Major (on women and religion) in illus-
trating the often surprisingly intense involvement of the less radical fem-
inist psychologists with one another’s insights and imperatives. That me-
diated dynamic at the same time both fostered and illustrated a sense of
interpersonal relations based not upon the more familiar and aggressively
competitive masculinist model but rather upon a companionate model of
community effort and shared discourse, a model whose troubling echoes
of the egalitarian revolution across the Channel were of course quite ev-
ident among the alarmed male establishment.
Wharton’s argument proceeds from her conviction that the signal con-
tributions to the history of philosophy made by Romantic-era women are
grounded in the physical, material aspects of human experience—in this
case in the materiality of texts, according to which interpretation these au-
thors “understood literature as psychology inmotion” (27).Wharton’s sys-
tematic examination of the work of five womenwriters assesses the emerg-
ing late Enlightenment opinion that physical, material objects—written
texts in particular—possess a degree of agency through whose effects they
may shape physical actions and bothdefine and regulate social associations
and behaviors. In the process, she contends, these writers drew ever nearer
anunderstandingof physicalmatter as fundamentally active, not static, and
therefore endued with social, religious, and political significance (29).
Wharton’s case studies areAnna Letitia Barbauld (particularly her Les-
sons for Children, 1778–79, andHymns in Prose for Children, 1781), Honara
Edgeworth (Practical Education, 1798),HannahMore (Strictures on . . .Fe-
male Education, 1799, and Coelebs in Search of a Wife, 1808–9), Elizabeth
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Hamilton (especially Letters on the Elementary Principles of Education,
1801), and Maria Edgeworth (especially Practical Education, 1798, with
Richard Lovell Edgeworth; and The Parent’s Assistant, 1800). Wharton
cites Barbauld’s Providentialism as a lifelong intellectual touchstone, trac-
ing it through both that prolific author’s Dissenting intellectual, cultural,
and religious milieu and her voluminous literary production. Barbauld’s
characteristic emphasis on cultivating a “devotional” attitude both to the
naturalworld and tohumanproductions informsbothher educational pro-
gram and her often contestatory sociopolitical stance as represented in
works as seemingly different as her prose Sins of Government (1793) and
her controversial poem Eighteen Hundred and Eleven (1812). Both of these
works, however, Wharton observes, are rooted in the principles she artic-
ulated in those early works for children: “greatness” (by which she means
moral superiority) is to be achieved not by means of “remedial” educa-
tion, however well intentioned, but rather by that providential interven-
tion through which individuals and societies learn through “mortifica-
tion” to reject pride, luxury, and cultural domination and to embrace
instead the salutary humility and moral steadfastness that result from
an informed, nurtured sensitivity to the lessons taught by the physical,
material world and its maker.
Wharton turns next to Honora (Sneyd) Edgeworth and her 1798 Prac-
tical Education, written in collaboration with her father Richard Lovell
Edgeworth. Like Barbauld—both in intellectual inclination and in applied
pedagogy—Honora Edgeworth adopts the Lockean principle of linking
education with pleasure, seasoning didacticismwith delight.What partic-
ularly distinguishes her, though, is her firm grounding in the efficacy of
the “experimental science” of education in which her work played and
important early role (74). A firm adherent of a disciplinarian approach
to education (children must be “managed,” “respectful,” “obedient”), she
was clearly no follower of Rousseau’s more indulgent paradigm, as Whar-
ton explains. And yet she was fundamentally “anti-despotic” both in theory
and in practice. Indeed, a particularly fascinating aspect of this chapter
is Wharton’s discussion of how Edgeworth’s notebook accounts of her
educational theories relate to their application in actual practices.Wharton
considers the notebooks both “as emotional objects and as knowledge ob-
jects,” as “repositories of the psychological and physical growth” of her chil-
dren, and then, later, as “artefacts of exemplary motherhood” (78–79).
While not strictly despotic, it emerges, her pedagogy is nevertheless firm
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in its reliance upon obedience and respect as “a necessary pre-condition
of the educative process” (95), a fundamentally paternalistic process that
she nevertheless envisions as benevolent and progressive.
InHannahMorewemeet the energeticmoralist eager to enlist Enlight-
enment philosophy in service to unswervingly conservative social and
political ends. Wharton first traces how More began early on to apply to
material and textual productions the associationism she learned from
Locke. Then she turns to the “later” (1799 and after), when More adapted
associationist techniques specifically to realign Enlightenment thought
with—and in service to—evangelical Christian morality. In her Strictures
(1799) More famously associated Mary Wollstonecraft with the “corrupt-
ing” influence of European thought and literature and its advocacy of fe-
male self-expression and self-empowerment. Hence in Coelebs (1808–9)
she redefines the domestic space as a site for female self-sacrifice as part
of a larger intellectual and sociopolitical project to “transform the hero
of [conventional sentimental] romance into a Christian ideal” (118). In
the “Mendip” schools that Hannah and Martha More founded, Wharton
explains, “mechanistic physical employment”was enlisted to reinforce class
barriers by not-so-subtly subverting popular democratizing efforts to ex-
pand literacy. Although favoring a strictly circumscribed curriculum com-
bined with authoritarian pedagogy (children’s “wicked ways”must be se-
verely corrected), More nevertheless appreciated that the carrot was more
effective than the stick and so adopted a sensory approach to education
that was not unlike Barbauld’s (More was in fact an admirer). It is not sur-
prising, then,Wharton suggests, thatMore’s Cheap Repository Tracts em-
ploy many of the same pedagogical strategies found in her schools and
their materials, marshaled in this case to reeducate laboring-class adults
into compliant loyalist citizens. By the time she reaches Coelebs, More has
turned her focus still more directly to women, transferring to them the
materialist pedagogy she had previously directed toward children and
then toward (primarily male) laborers, redirecting the model of “Chris-
tian economy” visible in the Strictures and the tracts (149). In all of these
efforts, Wharton points out, More’s consummate skill as thinker, writer,
rhetorician, and conservative ideologue ensured her extraordinary success
in the literary market, however dimly we may regard her ideas today. She
wrote with equal facility in the idiom of rich and poor, disenfranchised
and privileged, and—as many of her contemporaries recorded—she was
universally read. Her investment in a distinctly materialist Enlightenment
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philosophy (and its sociopolitical potential) reflects the extent to which she
hoped to harness that tradition (and its force) in service to loyalist, nation-
alist purposes.
ElizabethHamilton’s Elementary Principles of Education (1802)Whar-
ton situates solidly within the associationist tradition, too, regarding it as
a somewhat differently inflected but nevertheless thoroughly Christian
moral treatise despite Hamilton’s intellectually “ecumenical” practice of
drawing freely from theworks of friend and foe alikewhen it comes topur-
suing “truth.” Interestingly, Hamilton cites her own limited education as
an advantage: deprived of extensive formal education, she has learned
frommaterial experience, uninhibited by artificially imposedproscription.
LikeMore and Barbauld, Hamilton yokes Lockeanism and Christianity to
a single cart, regarding religion and psychology as “mutually illuminative”
(164), recognizing that (moral) education begins with those experiential
“building blocks” acquired starting in childhood where the majority of
their teachers are women. In the process she observes that this especially
formative function of women within education suggests one of the pri-
mary gender-based reasons why women’s foundational role within the
philosophical tradition in general has historically been insufficiently cred-
ited. Employing a variety of literary vehicles, including satire, Hamilton
constructs a practical argument grounded in associationist psychology
and built upon “experientially tested materials from sources both close
to and far from home” (167). Much as poets likeWordsworth and Robin-
son drew their imaginative ore from mines of the ordinary quotidian
world, so too did materialist philosophers such as Hamilton draw upon
those same universally familiar and accessible material sources for their
own democratizing exercises in philosophy and pedagogy. Near the end
of her chapter, Wharton insightfully reminds us not to misread Hamilton’s
domestic ideology as an inherently conservative one unattuned to femi-
nism, for “her writings proffer innovative, covert feminist strategies for
power” in their appeal to union and impartiality. She “conceptualizes the
science of mind as a comprehensive female philosophy; a domestic adap-
tation of embodied psychology that combines the religious, social and ex-
perimental” (194).
Finally,Maria Edgeworth is discussed, about whommore critical anal-
ysis has almost certainly been written than about the others whomWhar-
tonconsidershere, andwhosehomeWhartondescribes as “a space thatwas
populated by knowledge objects” (197). Again, that emphasis on the forma-
tive value of object, of material things, underpins the author’s thoughtful
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analysis of Edgeworth’s various books as “psychotechnologies of Enlight-
enment” (200). From The Parent’s Assistant (1796) through her late novel
Helen (1834), Wharton contends, Edgeworth’s attention is seldom far from
metaphysics and the science of mind, nor is there for her any functional
distance at all between art and science, which are inextricably linked in
the worldview that Maria Edgeworth derived from and shared with her
father. AsWharton neatly and succinctly writes at this chapter’s end, Edge-
worth’s novels are “repositories of inventions” whose “intertextual mech-
anisms animate the text,” requiring of their consumers an explicitly “in-
dustrious” variety of reading. Yet while her writing seems both to demand
and to direct materialist readings, those writings nevertheless “speak to the
vital necessity of the literary imagination tomaterial Enlightenment” (230).
In sum, then, it is worth noting thatWharton acknowledges—and ap-
propriately stresses—what too fewcultural critics of theRomantic erahave
acknowledged: that some of the most popular, influential, and persuasive
writers of the period were women whose stand on “gender politics” was
decidedly conservative and even downright reactionary. Like so much of
cultural criticism, that which addresses Romanticism typically embraces
the new, the progressive, the contestatory, the rebellious while repudiating
the staid, the conventional, the conservative, the mortally didactic. And
yet, to do so in this binary fashion is to misread and oversimplify the rich
rhetorical, intellectual, sociopolitical, and cultural dynamism of this re-
markable era. Just as Romanticism studies have begun to expand the field’s
parameters to include the physical sciences, technology, and industry, is
fresh attention being paid to parallel advances in psychology, physiology,
andmedicine, and in the process finally beginning adequately to trace and
credit the remarkable contributions to all these areas also of women. As
we reformulate our understanding of what Romanticism both was and
is, Wharton’s Material Enlightenment contributes meaningfully to this
important project of recovery and reassessment.
Stephen Behrendt, University of Nebraska
doi: 10.1086/707200
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